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NIST Special Publication 800-88r1 covers this concept in excruciating detail

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Special...0-88r1.pdf

Bookmarked. Although I would like to see some proof of concept somewhere. Specifically studies and experiments done entirely on overwrite/clear methods on drives. I think that would be more useful than NIST guidelines that tell you to overwrite your hard drive, and overwrite it more to be safer. Of course that's simplified but it's still nothing we haven't heard before and doesn't do a great job of lowering our suspicions.

To clarify, you understand that NIST is the National Institute of Standards and Technology right? They create the Special Publications in guidance w/ the National Security Agency (NSA) as required under the Computer Security Act of 1987. These are the guides that the Federal Government of the United States of America uses to secure their Top Secret data.

The proof of concept you seek exists, I'm sure plenty has been published on the Internetz. Ultimately all I'm saying is that if these guides from NIST are good enough to protect US Top Secret data such as launch codes and the like, it's good enough for me

Remember the term "Top Secret" really means something. It means data that if exposed could cause "exceptionally grave" damage to the nation.
"Secret" classification means data that if exposed could cause "serious" damage.
"Confidential" is data that could cause damage if exposed.
There's also "sensitive but unclassified" data.

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EDIT: I should say that the Fed Gov't is REQUIRED to use these guides under CSA 1987.

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Also, the CSA 1987 was repealed by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, but FISMA still assigned the same requirements of NIST/NSA, so it's a net difference of 0 basically.

I understand who the NIST is. I'm just saying there is still some grey areas despite that.

While most devices support some form of Clear, not all devices have a reli
able Purge
mechanism. For moderate confidentiality data, the media owner may choose to accept the risk of
applying Clear techniques to the media, acknowledging that some data may be able to be
retrieved by someone with the time, knowledge, and skills to do so.

I assume someone who is attempting to stay out of jail/prison would classify their information as high confidentiality. Based on this it sounds like clear techniques would not be suitable. But the clear techniques recommend 1 -2 overwrites for most devices, does continual reuse of the clear techniques on the device eventually lessen recovery? If 1-2 overwrites isn't the best choice for something with moderate + confidentiality, does 3-5, 7-10 overwrites make it suitable? Otherwise there's no reason to feel safer after re-writing when there's still too much risk unless you have the time/resources to purge and/or destroy.

I don't mean to undermine any of the work done here I'm just trying to point out where there might be grey areas for some people. I hope you understand what I'm getting at.