RE: Stepping up my security - Skryptec - 08-14-2016
Ever heard of using BitLocker and GNU Privacy Assistant.
RE: Stepping up my security - Nil - 08-14-2016
(08-14-2016, 10:07 PM)roger_smith Wrote: (08-14-2016, 09:19 PM)Cosvo Wrote: (08-14-2016, 09:03 PM)roger_smith Wrote: Again, look up the term "Data Remanence" and tell me how secure you feel Oh my:/
(08-14-2016, 09:26 PM)Cosvo Wrote: (08-14-2016, 09:23 PM)roger_smith Wrote: and so what did you learn? I've learned that even though I think my shit is deleted they are not lol :/
Thanks Roger.S
For more detailed explanation, see below:
There are a number of common terms associated data and its destruction. Some of those terms include "Erasing, Clearing, Purging and Sanitization".
Erasing is literally just that, you use the "delete" option in your operating system. This would be something like emptying your recycle bin in Windows. All you are doing is removing the pointer information to the location of that file on the hard drive. This can be easily recovered.
Clearing can also be known as overwriting. This is generally what people are doing when they "write zeros" or other disk preparation methods. While more difficult, it is still possible to retrieve data from devices treated in such a fashion via data recovery labs. Also, this method would NOT touch any sectors of a hard drive that had data in them, but were later marked as bad sectors. Also, solid state media can not be reliably prepared using this method due to the way solid state works.
Purging data is a more intense form is clearing. Basically it's performing clearing functions multiple times.
and finally
Sanitization is a comprehensive process that includes removing or destroying all non-volatile memory (storage media), removing any CD/DVD media, purging and destroying storage media (ssd, hdd, etc).
Contrary to popular belief, degaussing a hard disk drive is NOT a form of sanitization alone. While degaussing CAN leave a disk in what appears to be a sanitized state, often times the degaussing process only damages the electronic components of the hard drive, but leaves the magnetic storage minimally affected. A sophisticated attacker could remove the platters from the damaged unit, or replace the damaged electronics and recover the data.
The only ~100% assurable way of destroying data irrecoverably, is complete physical destruction of the storage media via shredding, incineration, or chemical process.
Isn't there a certain interval of overwrites where the previous data is considered not salvageable? And isn't their software that automatically does this to that "safe" limit? What's your opinion on this tactic assuming the entirety of the disk can be overwritten?
RE: Stepping up my security - Nyx - 08-14-2016
Honestly, unless you're doing very illegal things I doubt anything is going to come back and bite you in the ass and I wouldn't worry very much about it. At 15 I doubt there is much you've done or even know how to do for that matter that could get you in that much shit. Just stay legal if you're scared of a future behind bars.
RE: Stepping up my security - roger_smith - 08-14-2016
(08-14-2016, 10:28 PM)God Wrote: (08-14-2016, 10:07 PM)roger_smith Wrote: (08-14-2016, 09:19 PM)Cosvo Wrote: Oh my:/
(08-14-2016, 09:26 PM)Cosvo Wrote: I've learned that even though I think my shit is deleted they are not lol :/
Thanks Roger.S
For more detailed explanation, see below:
There are a number of common terms associated data and its destruction. Some of those terms include "Erasing, Clearing, Purging and Sanitization".
Erasing is literally just that, you use the "delete" option in your operating system. This would be something like emptying your recycle bin in Windows. All you are doing is removing the pointer information to the location of that file on the hard drive. This can be easily recovered.
Clearing can also be known as overwriting. This is generally what people are doing when they "write zeros" or other disk preparation methods. While more difficult, it is still possible to retrieve data from devices treated in such a fashion via data recovery labs. Also, this method would NOT touch any sectors of a hard drive that had data in them, but were later marked as bad sectors. Also, solid state media can not be reliably prepared using this method due to the way solid state works.
Purging data is a more intense form is clearing. Basically it's performing clearing functions multiple times.
and finally
Sanitization is a comprehensive process that includes removing or destroying all non-volatile memory (storage media), removing any CD/DVD media, purging and destroying storage media (ssd, hdd, etc).
Contrary to popular belief, degaussing a hard disk drive is NOT a form of sanitization alone. While degaussing CAN leave a disk in what appears to be a sanitized state, often times the degaussing process only damages the electronic components of the hard drive, but leaves the magnetic storage minimally affected. A sophisticated attacker could remove the platters from the damaged unit, or replace the damaged electronics and recover the data.
The only ~100% assurable way of destroying data irrecoverably, is complete physical destruction of the storage media via shredding, incineration, or chemical process. Isn't there a certain interval of overwrites where the previous data is considered not salvageable? And isn't their software that automatically does this to that "safe" limit? What's your opinion on this tactic assuming the entirety of the disk can be overwritten?
In terms of DoD and Top Secret data, the only destruction level considered assured is sanitization of the media, typically through means of physical destruction.
DoD disk wiping standards state that on magnetic media, 7 passes of random data is acceptable. However, they still would not move media that once contained Top Secret information down to a lower classification AFAIK. Keep in mind that Top Secret data is data that is considered to cause exceptionally grave damage to the security of the nation in the event of exposure. However, consider yourself "the nation" and decide what you think "exceptionally grave damage" is to yourself, and make your decision from there .
(08-14-2016, 10:23 PM)Skryptec Wrote: Ever heard of using BitLocker and GNU Privacy Assistant.
BitLocker requires a certain level of Windows (Pro+ I believe for win10. not sure about previous versions).
GNU Privacy Assistant is a GUI for implementing GPG. I don't believe GPG is an appropriate whole-disk encryption solution. I would add this as supplement file-level encryption option.
Before someone says it, Truecrypt is broken, and likely was cracked by the Federali (personal speculation due to the mysterious nature of their departure). There are spinoffs of it that may or may not be feasible solutions. Do your own homework.
RE: Stepping up my security - Nil - 08-14-2016
(08-14-2016, 11:11 PM)roger_smith Wrote: (08-14-2016, 10:28 PM)God Wrote: (08-14-2016, 10:07 PM)roger_smith Wrote: For more detailed explanation, see below:
There are a number of common terms associated data and its destruction. Some of those terms include "Erasing, Clearing, Purging and Sanitization".
Erasing is literally just that, you use the "delete" option in your operating system. This would be something like emptying your recycle bin in Windows. All you are doing is removing the pointer information to the location of that file on the hard drive. This can be easily recovered.
Clearing can also be known as overwriting. This is generally what people are doing when they "write zeros" or other disk preparation methods. While more difficult, it is still possible to retrieve data from devices treated in such a fashion via data recovery labs. Also, this method would NOT touch any sectors of a hard drive that had data in them, but were later marked as bad sectors. Also, solid state media can not be reliably prepared using this method due to the way solid state works.
Purging data is a more intense form is clearing. Basically it's performing clearing functions multiple times.
and finally
Sanitization is a comprehensive process that includes removing or destroying all non-volatile memory (storage media), removing any CD/DVD media, purging and destroying storage media (ssd, hdd, etc).
Contrary to popular belief, degaussing a hard disk drive is NOT a form of sanitization alone. While degaussing CAN leave a disk in what appears to be a sanitized state, often times the degaussing process only damages the electronic components of the hard drive, but leaves the magnetic storage minimally affected. A sophisticated attacker could remove the platters from the damaged unit, or replace the damaged electronics and recover the data.
The only ~100% assurable way of destroying data irrecoverably, is complete physical destruction of the storage media via shredding, incineration, or chemical process. Isn't there a certain interval of overwrites where the previous data is considered not salvageable? And isn't their software that automatically does this to that "safe" limit? What's your opinion on this tactic assuming the entirety of the disk can be overwritten?
In terms of DoD and Top Secret data, the only destruction level considered assured is sanitization of the media, typically through means of physical destruction.
DoD disk wiping standards state that on magnetic media, 7 passes of random data is acceptable. However, they still would not move media that once contained Top Secret information down to a lower classification AFAIK. Keep in mind that Top Secret data is data that is considered to cause exceptionally grave damage to the security of the nation in the event of exposure. However, consider yourself "the nation" and decide what you think "exceptionally grave damage" is to yourself, and make your decision from there .
Thanks for the reply.
http://www.howtogeek.com/115573/htg-explains-why-you-only-have-to-wipe-a-disk-once-to-erase-it/
That article talks about that special number I was referring to, which seems to be 35, but is outdated and irrelevant to modern day drives.
Back to the article that states one overwrite is sufficient, here's a reply to the article:
Quote:You have lost the last of your credibility on this one. I have recovery software designed to extract over written disks. The process is basically forensic science against lax security. Using simple filters to subtract the ‘patterned’ overwrite will reveal enough evidence to prosecute in a US court of law. Use a 3-pass pseudo random for most re-use issues, 7-pass if you have stuff you don’t want the average geek to find. Otherwise it CAN be recovered with forensic software. My forensic OS can find things that will make most PC owners blush, or furious – LOL
Makes you skeptical of where you get your information from and what you can actually believe. Because I for one have browsed H2G periodically.
Edit: The problem with all these claims is that there's hardly ever any proof. I'm not saying H2G is wrong because other experts have stated similar things. You don't hear of a government recovering info off of a SSD that's been correctly overwritten besides people telling you they can, such as the comment above. I'll continue to look around and share links if you want.
RE: Stepping up my security - roger_smith - 08-15-2016
NIST Special Publication 800-88r1 covers this concept in excruciating detail
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf
RE: Stepping up my security - Nil - 08-15-2016
(08-15-2016, 12:05 AM)roger_smith Wrote: NIST Special Publication 800-88r1 covers this concept in excruciating detail
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf
Bookmarked. Although I would like to see some proof of concept somewhere. Specifically studies and experiments done entirely on overwrite/clear methods on drives. I think that would be more useful than NIST guidelines that tell you to overwrite your hard drive, and overwrite it more to be safer. Of course that's simplified but it's still nothing we haven't heard before and doesn't do a great job of lowering our suspicions.
RE: Stepping up my security - roger_smith - 08-15-2016
(08-15-2016, 12:58 AM)God Wrote: (08-15-2016, 12:05 AM)roger_smith Wrote: NIST Special Publication 800-88r1 covers this concept in excruciating detail
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf
Bookmarked. Although I would like to see some proof of concept somewhere. Specifically studies and experiments done entirely on overwrite/clear methods on drives. I think that would be more useful than NIST guidelines that tell you to overwrite your hard drive, and overwrite it more to be safer. Of course that's simplified but it's still nothing we haven't heard before and doesn't do a great job of lowering our suspicions.
To clarify, you understand that NIST is the National Institute of Standards and Technology right? They create the Special Publications in guidance w/ the National Security Agency (NSA) as required under the Computer Security Act of 1987. These are the guides that the Federal Government of the United States of America uses to secure their Top Secret data.
The proof of concept you seek exists, I'm sure plenty has been published on the Internetz. Ultimately all I'm saying is that if these guides from NIST are good enough to protect US Top Secret data such as launch codes and the like, it's good enough for me 
Remember the term "Top Secret" really means something. It means data that if exposed could cause "exceptionally grave" damage to the nation.
"Secret" classification means data that if exposed could cause "serious" damage.
"Confidential" is data that could cause damage if exposed.
There's also "sensitive but unclassified" data.
EDIT: I should say that the Fed Gov't is REQUIRED to use these guides under CSA 1987.
Also, the CSA 1987 was repealed by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, but FISMA still assigned the same requirements of NIST/NSA, so it's a net difference of 0 basically.
RE: Stepping up my security - Nil - 08-15-2016
(08-15-2016, 01:20 AM)roger_smith Wrote: (08-15-2016, 12:58 AM)God Wrote: (08-15-2016, 12:05 AM)roger_smith Wrote: NIST Special Publication 800-88r1 covers this concept in excruciating detail
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf
Bookmarked. Although I would like to see some proof of concept somewhere. Specifically studies and experiments done entirely on overwrite/clear methods on drives. I think that would be more useful than NIST guidelines that tell you to overwrite your hard drive, and overwrite it more to be safer. Of course that's simplified but it's still nothing we haven't heard before and doesn't do a great job of lowering our suspicions.
To clarify, you understand that NIST is the National Institute of Standards and Technology right? They create the Special Publications in guidance w/ the National Security Agency (NSA) as required under the Computer Security Act of 1987. These are the guides that the Federal Government of the United States of America uses to secure their Top Secret data.
The proof of concept you seek exists, I'm sure plenty has been published on the Internetz. Ultimately all I'm saying is that if these guides from NIST are good enough to protect US Top Secret data such as launch codes and the like, it's good enough for me 
Remember the term "Top Secret" really means something. It means data that if exposed could cause "exceptionally grave" damage to the nation.
"Secret" classification means data that if exposed could cause "serious" damage.
"Confidential" is data that could cause damage if exposed.
There's also "sensitive but unclassified" data.
EDIT: I should say that the Fed Gov't is REQUIRED to use these guides under CSA 1987.
Also, the CSA 1987 was repealed by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, but FISMA still assigned the same requirements of NIST/NSA, so it's a net difference of 0 basically.
I understand who the NIST is. I'm just saying there is still some grey areas despite that.
Quote:While most devices support some form of Clear, not all devices have a reli
able Purge
mechanism. For moderate confidentiality data, the media owner may choose to accept the risk of
applying Clear techniques to the media, acknowledging that some data may be able to be
retrieved by someone with the time, knowledge, and skills to do so.
I assume someone who is attempting to stay out of jail/prison would classify their information as high confidentiality. Based on this it sounds like clear techniques would not be suitable. But the clear techniques recommend 1 -2 overwrites for most devices, does continual reuse of the clear techniques on the device eventually lessen recovery? If 1-2 overwrites isn't the best choice for something with moderate + confidentiality, does 3-5, 7-10 overwrites make it suitable? Otherwise there's no reason to feel safer after re-writing when there's still too much risk unless you have the time/resources to purge and/or destroy.
I don't mean to undermine any of the work done here I'm just trying to point out where there might be grey areas for some people. I hope you understand what I'm getting at.
RE: Stepping up my security - sleaze - 08-15-2016
(08-14-2016, 10:36 PM)Tarew Wrote: Honestly, unless you're doing very illegal things I doubt anything is going to come back and bite you in the ass and I wouldn't worry very much about it. At 15 I doubt there is much you've done or even know how to do for that matter that could get you in that much shit. Just stay legal if you're scared of a future behind bars.
p sure cracka was 15
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